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Preface 
 
 
India is rapidly taking stronger positions in the global political arena and the 
world economy. By consequence countries need to redefine their relations with 
India. For the EU this has led to the start of negotiations on a free trade agree
ment. 
 The fact that the latest policy paper on India by the Dutch Government 
(Beleidsnota India), prepared in 2005, makes no reference to a possible free 
trade agreement, is a sign of the swiftness of change. At that time, a likely 
prospect was that further economic integration with India would be achieved on 
the short term through a multilateral liberalization of trade under the Doha 
Round of WTO trade negotiations. Up to the present, however, the Round has 
failed to deliver. Parties continue searching for a compromise on global trade 
reform reflecting that India, with Brazil and other key emerging economies, has 
brought its political bargaining power in close range to that of the EU and US. A 
number of countries, foremost the US, have proceeded to realize the benefits of 
bilateral and regional economic integration. The European Commission has re
sponded to these developments in its 2006 strategy paper 'Global Europe: 
Competing in the World' in which India was listed as a priority country for a free 
trade agreement (FTA). Already in October 2007, the first round of negotiations 
between the European Commission and the Government of India took place. 
 The negotiations on an EUIndia FTA, which have gone through their third 
round at present, will aim to reduce tariff and core nontariff barriers on 'sub
stantially all trade' between the EU and India. It is expected that the negotiating 
process will take considerable time and effort, particularly on sensitive dossiers 
such as agricultural market access. The present study applies global economic 
modeling in order to quantify the overall economic effects of a potential FTA for 
the EU and India. It aims to make a substantial contribution to the negotiation 
process, in particular by suggesting the possible ramifications of reform of tariff 
and core nontariff barriers on bilateral trade between the EU and India. Further
more, the study assesses the possible implications for agricultural markets in 
India by which it lays the basis for further work on the controversies over agri
cultural liberalization and India's policy goals of poverty reduction and self
sufficiency in food. 
 This paper is a result of a broader effort to deepen the understanding of 
India's agricultural trade policies that LEI and Wageningen International under
take upon request by the Netherlands Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
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Summary 
 
 
India combines strong support to the endeavours for global trade reform under 
the World Trade Organisation institutions with an active pursuance of preferen
tial trading arrangements. India views such bilateral and regional trade agree
ments as 'building blocks' towards the overall objective of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. Currently, India's preferential trading arrangements mainly involve 
neighbour countries. Whether there is an economic rationale for India to engage 
in preferential trading arrangements with more advanced economies such as 
the EU is to be assessed empirically.  
 This study examines a possible arrangement between the EU and India, as a 
case study on the interests of developing countries in a free trade agreement 
(FTA) with highincome partners. Its aim is to examine the interests of both par
ties in slashing tariffs on bilateral merchandise trade. Of particular interest are 
the implications for agricultural markets, given the tension between agricultural 
liberalisation and India's policy goals relating to selfsufficiency in food grains 
and poverty reduction.  
 
India's interests in a free trade agreement with the EU 
India's interests in a free trade agreement with the EU are downplayed by the 
fact that India's economy is not well integrated in global markets. Particularly 
agriculture is a closed sector by all measures. With the EU there is limited eco
nomic integration even though the EU is India's largest trading partner for indus
trial goods and services. Of all bilateral merchandise trade, 95% consists of 
industrial goods, the rest are agricultural products. The total volume of bilateral 
agricultural trade is as limited as USD 2.4 bln (data for 2004/05), mostly con
sisting of Indian exports of tropical products, fruit and vegetables, oilseeds and 
oils, and cereals into the EU. Due to the limited trade preferences granted to In
dia, the average tariffs on Indian agricultural goods applied by the EU are rela
tively high compared to imports from other countries. India sees obvious 
offensive interests, therefore, which relate to improving the access for export 
products to the EU market. Also an agreement may work to reduce the input 
costs for export industries in parallel with improved access to highquality in
puts. Even so, India's main offensive interest in an FTA with the EU concerns tar
iff concessions for industrial products (textiles in particular), and much the same 
goes for the EU visàvis India. 
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 Possible defensive interests are evident from India's current tariff schedule 
and structure of imports. They point at possibly large trade diversion effects 
under an agreement with the EU since such a deal is likely to replace current 
imports from lowercost producers in Asia by products from the EU. In addition, 
given India's strong border protection, deep concessions to the EU may cause 
large displacement effects as domestic producers suffer from the increased 
competition of imports from the EU. Such effects, combined with the pivotal 
role claimed for agriculture in livelihood strategies of the poor and vulnerable, 
explain why agriculture plays a marginal role in India's bilateral and regional 
agreements and is excluded in most cases. Likewise, the prospects are dim for 
a deep integration of agricultural markets with the EU via a free trade agree
ment.  
 
A quantitative impact assessment 
The overall economic effects and particular productrelated interests are ex
plored in model simulations of a possible EU  India FTA. The analysis employs a 
global economywide model (GTAPAGR) using a recent database. The macro
economic effects of changes in policies are assessed by a wellestablished wel
fare economic compensation measure. Since the impacts of preferential trading 
arrangements are ambiguous, the outcome of the opposing forces of trade 
creation and trade diversion needs to be assessed empirically.  
 Because the welfare outcome may depend on the degree of liberalisation 
undertaken within the FTA, we have applied welfare analysis to a whole range of 
depths of reform. This has allowed us to explore the common ground for a FTA 
between India and the EU, as well as conflicts of interests. The summary table 
reports on the simulated welfare effects for certain key scenarios.  
 A manufacturesonly FTA has potentially positive effects on both India and 
EU. Whereas it would be welfaremaximising for both countries to strive for 
complete liberalisation by the EU of nonagricultural trade, there are opposing 
interests in terms of liberalisation by India. Assuming that any politically feasible 
agreement needs to yield positive welfare impacts for both parties, India's liber
alisation would be in between 30 and 70%, with the lower number maximising 
India's welfare. Thus, the 'optimal' liberalisation of nonagricultural trade from In
dia's perspective is a complete abolishment of tariffs by the EU (100% liberali
sation), combined with a limited effort in India involving a 30% slash of applied 
tariffs on imports. 
 If we broaden the scope of the deal to include agricultural trade liberalisa
tion, few additional gains occur. We analysed agricultural liberalisation on top of 
an asymmetric FTA in manufactures trade (full liberalisation by the EU and 30% 
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by India). Results indicate limited benefits for India from its own liberalisation, 
which contrast with significant benefits from EU agricultural liberalisation. For 
India, the extent to which the EU liberalises agricultural trade is a critical factor. 
India's 'optimum' is defined under the scenarios of 100% liberalisation by the EU 
with 20% by India. This scenario of partial opening for industrial and agricultural 
products from the EU combined with the complete removal in the EU of tariffs 
on imports from India maximises India's gains from an arrangement with the EU 
at 0.2% of GDP. 
 
Table 1 Income effects under 'optimal' scenarios a) 
Scenarios (Depth of liberalisation in% under selected scenarios) 
 India maximises gains EU maximises gains 
 Only non
agricultural 
Nonagricul
tural b) & 
agricultural 
Only non
agricultural 
Non
agricultural b) 
& agricultural 
EU tariff cut on im
ports from India 
100 100 100 80 
India tariff cut on 
imports from EU 
30 20 70 100 
Simulated effects (% of GDP) 
EU 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.005 
India 0.126 0.209 0.017 0.145 
a) Welfare effects based on the equivalent variation measure; b) Agricultural liberalisation scenarios combined 
with nonagricultural liberalisation scenario EU_100/India_30. 
Source: model simulations. 
 
Conclusions 
An interpretation of these welfare effects, combined with a review of the effects 
on factors of production, output and trade, leads to the following conclusions:  
 
 'The overall interests of India in a trade deal with the EU that slashes tariffs 
on bilateral merchandise trade are limited, although specific risks and gains 
are present.' 
 
 India has little to gain and much to lose from a free trade agreement with the 
EU if it merely involves tariff reduction in trade with the EU. A stronger economic 
rationale for a free trade agreement with the EU is possibly found in the benign 
effects of 'deep' economic integration, i.e. a move towards an economic space 
where goods and capital move without barriers under jointly shared rules  but 
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these have not been examined. The impact of tariff reduction under a possible 
EU  India free trade agreement involves potential losses from a farreaching FTA 
with the EU. The EU, an important source of industrial imports for India, will ex
pand its position on the Indian market in the area of industrial goods and extrac
tion goods, particularly at the expense of lowercost producers in Asian 
countries. The EU is hardly a logical trading partner for more labourintensive 
manufactures or for agricultural products from the perspective of production 
costs. The widely feared displacement of domestic production by imports of EU 
origin appears limited, however, and few Indian jobs are directly at risk. As far 
as offensive exportrelated interests are concerned, the study finds gains re
lated to improving the access for export products to the EU market, reducing 
input costs for export industries in parallel with improved access to highquality 
input. This transfer of technology is intertwined with an agenda for direct in
vestment into India. Particular product related offensive interests explored in 
model simulations conditional on the EU opening up markets involve textiles, 
cotton for intermediate deliveries to textiles industry, rice, and possibly sugar. 
 
The EU economy remains essentially unperturbed by integration with India 
The simulations indicate limited scope for welfare gains in the EU, but on the 
other hand no major welfare losses either. Sectorspecific interests include of
fensive interests in capitalintensive manufacturing and natural resource extrac
tion (presumably oil and fuels). Offensive interests for an agricultureinclusive 
deal are present in the fruits and vegetables sector. 
 
The estimated positive impacts from an EU  India FTA erode under a successful 
global trade reform embodied by a possible Doha agreement 
As expected, a global reform reduces the potential gains for India from an FTA 
with the EU and, at the same time, narrows the scope for trade diversion and 
concurrent efficiency losses. For India, a moderation of the risk of strong losses 
could provide leeway to embark on a track of bilateral integration with the EU 
despite a strong economic rationale. In the EU, multilateral liberalisation re
duces the incentives for a FTA with India, but it does not change the incentives 
for a particular level of liberalisation. For the EU we find even smaller welfare 
gains with a Doha agreement in place, but also the optimal level of liberalisation 
of agriculture reduces from 80 to 40%.  
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An EU  India agreement on merchandise trade is unlikely to embody substantial 
preferential treatment with regard to market access 
If the welfare analysis outlines the feasible options for trade integration between 
India and the EU, the arrangement would be characterised by a strong asymme
try: even though full liberalisation of agriculture by India would be 'optimal' for 
the EU (see table), this is still combined with a strongly asymmetric liberalisation 
of nonagriculture (100% by EU and 30% by India). The analysis indicates that it 
would be in the interest of both partners if the EU provides large concessions to 
India for access to its markets, while India keeps the bulk of current border pro
tection. This finding contrasts with the current trade policy of the EU which fo
cuses on reciprocal trade agreements, and it is potentially conflicting with WTO 
rules that require a FTA to cover 'substantially all the trade' between the con
stituent members. It is therefore likely that an EU  India agreement will embody 
a wide coverage of merchandise trade, even if excluding from its coverage sen
sitive areas in agriculture and textiles like many other FTAs. At the same time, 
the depth of preferential treatment on market access that India and the EU will 
grant to imports from their FTA partner will probably be modest, and engineered 
towards specific benign impact in certain areas. 
 
Agriculture is a key sector for India in the consideration of equity and growth 
purposes of a FTA with EU 
India's welfaremaximising policy, given full liberalisation by the EU, involves a 
30% cut of agricultural import tariffs for EU products and a 70% cut of tariffs on 
other merchandise trade. Agricultural reform creates large rents for land
owners, and has a limited pull effect on unskilled labour. This strategy maxi
mises income gains (an approximation of economic growth), and it generates 
small but positive effects on poverty alleviation. A maximisation of poverty alle
viation effects requires an alternative policy, i.e. a deeper liberalisation of manu
factures trade while leaving agricultural protection at the status quo. This policy, 
basically a textilesoriented export strategy, results in a pull of unskilled labour 
demand in textiles and cotton farming, resulting in positive employment (or 
wage) effects for landless and urban labourers. Substantial poverty alleviating 
effects are achieved, however, at the expense of income gains due to strong 
trade diversion effects. These are indications that trade policies in India feature 
a tradeoff between a stronggrowth policy and poverty alleviation, pressing the 
need for the government of India to strike a balance between these potentially 
conflicting goals. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
With the Doha Round of nearglobal trade negotiations under the World Trade 
Organisation is facing headwinds, there is a renewed interest in trade integra
tion on a bilateral track. The US are negotiating free trade agreements or less 
ambitious deals with trade partners in Asia and Latin America. Asian countries 
including India, opposing such deals for a long time, are also actively exploring 
opportunities on the bilateral path. These developments have considerable im
plications for third parties. Threatened by the prospects of a Doha round that 
fails to result in substantially improved global market access and bilateral inte
gration of its competitors, the EU has responded with a strategy of its own 
(European Commission, 2006). Thus we see a growing 'wave' of regionalism, 
largely with a NorthSouth orientation.  
 There is a large literature on preferential trading arrangements, covering 
both conceptual and empirical grounds.1 Theoretical ambiguity implies that ana
lysts must rely on empirical assessments in order to arrive at a conclusion on 
the desirability of regional integration on economic grounds. This study contrib
utes to the ex ante evidence on the interests of the developing countries in a 
regional trade deal with highincome partners. It examines a possible arrange
ment between the EU and India, as a case study.  
 We are particularly interested in the implications for agricultural markets, 
given the tension between agricultural liberalisation and India's policy goals relat
ing to selfsufficiency and poverty reduction. A strong opponent of multilateral 
liberalisation, India has simultaneously demanded policy instruments to be able 
to shield producers from global markets in cases of strong sudden import com
petition. The agricultural sector is designated a prime beneficiary of this protec
tion under a policy goal to achieve selfsufficiency. We therefore explore the 
impact of a FTA in the absence of a Doha deal, to assess whether similar safe
guards are required. We then assess whether a successful conclusion of the 
Doha round would alter India's position in the FTA. 
 The analysis is based on a quantitative assessment of the economic impact 
of an EU  India trade agreement under varying depth of reform. A global gen
eral equilibrium modelling framework has become the standard for this type of 
                                                 
1 Regional trade agreements are another term for preferential trading arrangements, and are not lim
ited to countries that are geographically close. For an overview of the academic literature on recipro
cal FTAs, see Panagariya (2000). 
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analysis. In particular we apply the GTAPAGR model, and version 7 of the GTAP 
database  a setup that allows us to analyse the effects on agricultural produc
tion and trade in ample detail. Still, in the assessment of a country as vast and 
heterogeneous as India, the analyst has to cope with substantial limitations dis
cussed below. 
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2 The scope and effects of bilateral and 
 regional trade agreements 
 
 
An EU  India trade agreement is one of dozens of preferential trading arrange
ments under preparation. Roza and Achterbosch (2007) count 43 initiatives that 
may have important implications for agricultural markets if the arrangement in
cludes substantial concessions on agricultural trade. The count is based on all 
bilateral or regional initiatives for a reciprocal arrangement, under negotiation or 
foreseen, that include one of the major agricultural trade nations (Australia, 
Canada, European Union, Japan, New Zealand and US), or China or India. The 
two other major agricultural nations, Brazil and Russia, are not actively pursuing 
new deals. In 26 initiatives, mutual agricultural trade of the potential partners 
exceeds an annual value of USD 1 billon. Of this subset of potential arrange
ments, 16 initiatives address a basesituation with agricultural tariffs exceeding 
15% ad valorem equivalent, including the FTA between EU and India. These 16 
initiatives thus offer scope for substantial concessions on agricultural trade.  
 The interests and drivers of preferential trade arrangements largely lie out
side the agrifood sector. Rather, these are defined by the opening up of oppor
tunities for trade in services and industrial goods and for investment. A scoping 
study on regional trade agreements in all areas outside agriculture (OECD, 
2005) identified the following areas as key areas: 
- market access for merchandise trade; 
- rules of origin; 
- trade defence instruments; 
- services; 
- trade facilitation. 
 
 With moderate ambition, agriculture is part of nearly all negotiations and the 
above areas are relevant for agriculture as well. 
 Typical provisions regarding market access are primarily aimed at an ex
pansion of trade between partners, which is regarded a basic, or 'shallow', de
gree of integration. In a process of economic integration, the expansion of trade 
relation will increase the incentives for more comprehensive cooperation in
crease. A 'deep' integration aims to develop 'a common marketplace across 
countries, that permits enterprises to operate easily across national borders 
and to integrate production in regional value chains' (Evans, Kaplinsky and Rob
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inson, 2006). In addition to lowering tariffs, deep integration involves harmonis
ing market institutions, standards and legal norms such as commercial prac
tices, administrative and contract law, regulation of labour markets and anti
trust behaviour, financial investment, and government procurement. A key char
acteristic of deep integration is a potential synergy between increased trade, in
creases in productivity, and growth (Evans, Kaplinsky and Robinson, 2006). 
 The coverage of agriculture under preferential trading arrangements typi
cally reflects the situation at the multilateral level: in many subsectors border 
protection and subsidies are exempted from the full discipline of reform. Yet 
there are occasional improvements, typically not concerning tariff concessions 
but areas such as safeguards and export competition (OECD, 2005). The pos
sible elements of negotiations on a preferential trading arrangement with rele
vance to agriculture are listed in table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1 Relevance of FTA negotiations to agriculture 
Label Scope 
Market access  
(tariffs) 
Concessions beyond MFN or general preferential schemes 
covering 'substantially all trade'. 
Productbased exemptions from the (deepest) cuts: sensi
tive products and special products. 
Rules of origin Serve to control potential spillovers of trade preferences on 
third countries. Substantial administrative transaction cost 
may prevent utilisation of trade preferences. 
Trade defence 
instruments 
Issues under negotiation include antidumping action, coun
tervailing duties, safeguard measures, etc. 
Trade facilitation Reductions of trading costs by facilitating procedures such 
as automated customs administration. 
Nontariff barriers Technical barriers including sanitary and phytosanitary 
(SPS) measures. Issues under negotiation include the 
equivalence of technical and safety standards, import cer
tificates, procedures for conformity assessment. 
Nontrade concerns Standards arising from non trade concerns including those 
related to environmental protection, labour standards, ani
mal welfare.  
Aim for consistent policies in terms of trade and agricultural 
development. 
Investment and  
intellectual property rights 
Liberalisation of direct investment; reform of economic in
stitutions including intellectual property rights. 
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 The welfare effects of a FTA are not straightforwardly determined. The intro
duction of the concepts of trade creation and trade diversion marked the devel
opment of the economic theory on preferential trade agreements. The legacy of 
Viner's 1950 classic 'The Customs Union Issue' remains important in the policy 
debate up to this day. Trade creation is defined as the shift from highercost 
domestic or foreign sources of goods to lowercosts sources from a partner 
country under the agreement. Because such a shift gives rise to reduced price 
levels in the importing country, and possible trade expansion, trade creation is 
commonly associated with a welfare gain for the importer. Trade diversion is 
the replacement of imports from lowercost sources outside the agreement by 
highercost sources of partners in the agreement. Due to a likely raise in the 
domestic price of imports and foregone tariff revenues, trade diversion often 
accounts negatively in the welfare analysis.1 It is likely that under a trade 
agreement trade creation in certain economic activities will coincide with trade 
diversion in other areas. By implication, the net welfare effect of a preferential 
trade agreement is theoretically ambiguous. Analysts must rely on empirical as
sessments in order to arrive at a conclusion on the net welfare impact of an 
agreement, examining the specific response of demand and supply to a policy. 
                                                 
1 Under certain conditions, most notably a strong price responsiveness of export supply from the not
lowestcost partner in the agreement, trade diversion may result in a welfare gain (Panagariya, 2000). 
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3 The likely scope of an EU  India FTA 
 
 
This chapter explores the scope of a trade agreement between the EU and In
dia. It starts with a short characterisation of the EU and Indian economy in a 
global context. Border protection in both countries is shortly described. The last 
section summarises some key features of trade relations between the EU and 
India and places it in the context of other possible FTA agreements of India. 
 
 
3.1 India and regionalism 
 
India combines strong support to endeavours for global trade reform under the 
World Trade Organisation institutions with the pursuance of an active FTA 
agenda. India views FTAs as 'building blocks' towards the overall objective of 
multilateral trade liberalisation (Government of India, 2007). Under the current 
government, India has been switching from Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) to 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreements (CEPAs). These broader 
agreements cover not only FTAs in goods and services, but also investment and 
they identify areas of economic cooperation. In Asia, India is not standing alone 
in this proliferation of regional or bilateral agreements. Korea, Pakistan, Singa
pore and Thailand are also frequently negotiating bilateral agreements  
 India is involved in some preferential trading arrangements mainly with South 
Asian partners, particularly neighbouring countries. It is a serious handicap to 
the South Asian FTAs that the policies to enhance economic integration work 
from a limited base of trade and investment between the countries: India's trade 
with its preferential partners in Asia only accounts for about 4% of its total 
global trade (Nataraj, 2007).  
 The main FTA that India is party to is the South Asian Preferential Trading Ar
rangement (SAPTA), signed in 1993 in the context of SAARC (South Asian Asso
ciation for Regional Cooperation). Under SAPTA, seven countries (India, 
Pakistan, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives) grant each other 
preferential trade concessions. At present, these concessions are limited. While 
SAPTA members pledge towards a genuine free trade area, political tension be
tween India and Pakistan constrains progress. India and Sri Lanka already trade 
under a bilateral arrangement, albeit largely to the benefit of the latter. The Bay 
of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
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(BIMSTEC), with India and Thailand among the most prominent of five members, 
specifies very limited concessions in a few sectors.  
 The possibly most promising FTA in the region, the Bangkok Agreement 
(BA), signed in 1975, features India, Bangladesh, South Korea, Laos and Sri 
Lanka. With the accession of China in 2001, the scheme's potential increased 
dramatically. However, the BA specifies concessions for just a few products. By 
implication of the limited scope of the concessions under the BA and SAPTA 
schemes, they render little impact on India's economic integration in the region. 
Stanford economist Romain Wacziarg (2003) concludes from the slow progress 
of initiatives that the feasibility of expanding regional trade agreements in South 
Asia and their scope in terms of increasing India's level of openness would 
probably be limited.  
 Complementary to the regional option, India is currently exploring the scope 
for preferential arrangements with partners that represent a more substantial 
expansion of India's external markets. Currently India is most active in pursuing 
a trilateral FTA with Brazil and South Africa (two of its colleagues from the G20 
group in the WTO negotiations). The focus changed since negotiations on a free 
trade agreement (FTA) with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
slowed down.1 At present, India is negotiating with the EU, Bangladesh, the Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC), Japan, Mauritius and the Southern African Customs 
Union. Other potential agreements are still under consideration with China, 
Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia and Russia. 
 Whether there is an economic rationale for India to engage in preferential 
trading arrangements with more advanced economies is to be assessed empiri
cally, and herein lays the contribution of the present study. As a part of the ex
ercise, we may identify to what extent concerns over the displacement of 
production under such arrangements are supported by economic analysis. The 
political feasibility of Indian policies to integrate with economic giants will de
pend on the strength of domestic resistance. 
                                                 
1 Wellinformed sources suggest that India's import duty on palm oil is troubling the negotiations with 
ASEAN (ICTSD, 2007). ASEAN wants India to reduce the duties on refined palm oil from 52.5 to 30%, 
and on crude palm oil from 45 to 40%. India refuses to do so, since it fears that import surges from 
Malaysia (and Indonesia) will harm Indian farmers growing oil crops. Moreover, an eventual agreement 
will be far less ambitious that India would like to, because services and foreign investment are not in
cluded and ASEAN has come up with a long list of 100 highly sensitive products. 
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3.2 Indian interests in EU free trade agreement 
 
India's economy is not well integrated in global markets, particularly agriculture. 
Merchandise trade as a percentage of GDP increased to about 33% in 
2006/07, from a base of 21% in 2000/01, reflecting limited but increasing 
openness of India's goods markets. Data for 2006 indicate that India is the 
world's 28th largest exporter of merchandise, with a share of 1% of world ex
ports (WTO 2007, appendix table A1.3); in commercial service exports, India 
ranks tenth with a share of 2.7%, up from 2.5% in 2002 (WTO 2007, appendix 
table A1.5). Owing to its large size India trades much less internationally than 
the average country but the integration is limited by all standards.  
 The EU is India's largest trading partner for industrial goods and services; 
agricultural markets are hardly integrated. Of all bilateral merchandise trade, 
95% consist of industrial goods. On the agricultural trade balance with the EU, 
the surplus of India's exports to the EU over imports from the EU amounts to 
USD 1.26 billion in 2006. When it comes to agricultural trade liberalisation, the 
regional trade agreements will not provide much leverage, since agriculture 
plays a marginal role in India's bilateral and regional agreements and is invaria
bly excluded in most cases. The Doha negotiations on agriculture therefore pre
sent the primary platform for India to pursue its agricultural liberalisation 
objectives. Tariff protection is underlying this pattern (table 3.1).  
 As far as agriculture is concerned, India has strong defensive interests to an 
arrangement with the EU. The offensive interests relate to improving the access 
for export products to the EU market, reducing input costs for export industries 
in parallel with improved access to highquality input. This transfer of technology 
is intertwined with an agenda for direct investment into India. Particular product 
related defensive and offensive interests are explored in model simulations con
ditional on EU opening up markets. 
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Table 3.1 Tariffs levied by EU and India on mutual imports a) 
 Tariffs levied by EU on 
imports from: 
Tariffs levied by India 
on imports from: 
 India rest of 
World 
EU rest of 
World 
Paddy rice 61.3 53.1 8.4 26.1 
Wheat 7.1 17.1 0.0 4.0 
Cereal grains nec b) 20.2 24.0 11.3 21.2 
Vegetables, fruit, nuts 1.5 15.4 43.9 34.4 
Oil seeds 0.1 0.0 25.7 34.8 
Sugar cane, sugar beet 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.7 
Plantbased fibbers 0.0 0.3 13.2 17.5 
Crops nec 1.8 6.9 26.0 34.0 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses 7.7 1.0 5.3 15.2 
Animal products nec 4.9 2.5 3.7 18.9 
Raw milk 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Wool, silkworm cocoons 0.0 0.0 15.0 20.0 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, horse 237.4 76.0 14.6 21.2 
Meat products nec 16.0 25.7 35.3 28.1 
Vegetable oils and fats 1.7 7.6 69.9 64.4 
Dairy products 19.9 39.3 35.9 31.1 
Processed rice 128.9 98.3 58.2 23.1 
Sugar 138.6 119.7 48.7 69.8 
Food products nec 7.1 8.2 39.6 31.9 
Beverages and tobacco products 20.4 9.1 138.6 87.1 
Natural resources  
extraction 
0.5 0.2 15.0 11.7 
Textiles and leather 7.2 5.2 15.1 15.0 
Labour intensive  
manufactures 
1.8 2.9 14.4 19.5 
Capital intensive  
manufactures 
0.4 1.3 14.0 14.0 
a) Tariffs are computed from tariff lines using trade as weights. Effective tariffs may thus be zero due to initial 
zero imports despite a tariff being present in practice; b)nec = not elsewhere classified. 
Source: GTAP Version 7, prerelease 3 (October 2007). 
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 Technology transfer is considered an important element of 'deep' economic 
integration between India and the EU, which would entail a move towards an 
economic space where goods and capital move without barriers, under jointly 
shared rules. Gasiorek et al. [2007] identify substantial scope for addressing 
such issues under an EU  India FTA, in particular in the areas of government 
procurement; services and investment; trade facilitation; defence measures in 
trade; nontariff barriers of standards and regulations that relate to WTO agree
ments on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical barriers to 
trade (TBT); intellectual property rights, and competition policy. Even though the 
account is somewhat biased towards the EU interest, on the basis of it one may 
conclude that the benign effects of deep economic integration could very well 
provide India with a strong economic rationale for a free trade agreement with 
the EU. However, a further quantitative analysis of such elements of an FTA lies 
beyond the scope of the present study. 
 
 
3.3 Agricultural interests of an EU  India deal versus other initiatives of 
 India 
 
Next to a potential deal with the EU India is exploring two other FTAs covering 
agriculture, with ASEAN and with Japan. Table 3.2 compares agricultural inter
ests of an EU  India deal with these other initiatives. Although the value of total 
bilateral trade with the EU (USD45.6 billion) by far exceeds the trade with the 
partners in the other agreements this does not hold for trade in agricultural 
products. Of the three potential agreements the one with ASEAN has the largest 
base on current trade in agricultural products (USD3.7 billion), which accounts 
for 22% of total trade with ASEAN partners.  
 Agriculture plays a marginal role in the trade relationship between the EU 
and India. Further, EU agricultural exports to India are very small compared to 
imports from India. However, the EU applies a relatively high average tariff on 
Indian agricultural goods. Main agricultural export products from India are: 
tropical products, fruit and vegetables, oilseeds and oils, and cereals. The EU's 
main interest in an FTA with India concerns tariff concessions for industrial 
products. 
 India has a lot to win from an FTA with ASEAN, since average agricultural tar
iffs in Indonesia and Thailand and to a lesser extent in Malaysia are very high 
and India has a negative agricultural trade balance with ASEAN. Inclusion of ag
riculture results in increased import competition for the Indian farm sector. 
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Table 3.2 Potential scope of agricultureinclusive FTAs for India 
 IndiaEU IndiaASEAN IndiaJapan 
Total bilateral trade (average 
2004/05, fob prices, billion USD) 
45.6 16.8 6.2 
Agricultural bilateral trade (average 
2004/05, fob prices) 
2.4 3.7 0.6 
Agricultural trade as percentage of  
total trade 
5 23 10 
Agricultural trade balance in favour of India ASEAN India 
 
Further information: 
EU  India EU ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/india/index
_en.htm 
 India commerce.nic.in/IndiaEUjap.pdf 
ASEANIndia ASEAN hwww.aseansec.org/4971.htm 
 India commerce.nic.in/agree_asean.htm 
IndiaJapan Japan www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/index_externaleconomicpol
icy.html 
 India commerce.nic.in/japan.pdf 
 
 23 
4 Model, data and scenarios 
 
 
Because preferential trade agreements cover several sectors if not the econ
omy at large, such policies are often assessed using economywide models.1 
This study employs an allsector model covering all regions of the world in order 
to assess the economywide implications in FTA partners as well as third coun
tries. Examples of previous studies with a similar setup are McDonald and 
Walmsley (2004) and Decreux and Mitaritonna (2007). Such studies share a fo
cus on the shallow integration because the implications of deep integration for 
productivity change and economic growth are particularly difficult to incorpo
rate. 
 
 
4.1 A short description of GTAPAGR 
 
Our estimates of economic effects from an EU  India FTA are obtained using an 
economywide model known as CGE (computable general equilibrium). This has 
become the dominant tool in global trade policy analysis. CGE models provide a 
complete representation of national economies and a specification of trade rela
tions between economies. CGE models are specifically concerned with resource 
allocation issues, that is, where the allocation of production factors over alterna
tive uses is affected by certain policies or exogenous developments. Interna
tional trade is typically an area where such induced effects are important 
consequences of policy choices. In the face of changing international prices, re
sources will move between alternative uses within the domestic economy, or 
even between economies if production factors are internationally mobile.  
 Market equilibrium models2 contain the response (behaviour) of economic 
agents to changes in prices (costs), and prices adjust so as to clear markets. 
The objective of these models is the determination of equilibrium prices and 
quantities on (interrelated) sets of markets. This class of models is firmly estab
lished within mainstream economics where the behavioural response of suppli
ers and buyers is typically derived from optimising assumptions: given a 
                                                 
1 Alternatively, the use of econometric models, such as gravity analysis in OECD (2007), may cover a 
range of sectors but is confined to the assessment of trade effects between FTA partners.  
2 'Gravity models' are another important class of models in international trade analysis. These are 
less explicit about their theoretical underpinning and focus on econometric estimates. They are 
sometimes used in exante analysis of trade policy changes. 
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description of the production technology, the supplier chooses a combination of 
inputs such that costs are minimised for a given level of output. Given a descrip
tion of consumer preferences, the buyer determines his preferred consumption 
bundle such that his/her utility is maximised for a given level of his/her budget. 
 The framework adopted in this study is a model of the GTAP (global trade 
analysis project) consortium, which is a comparative static, multisector, and 
multiregion general equilibrium model. Each country or region is depicted within 
the same structural model. The regional household to which the income of fac
tors, tariff revenues and taxes are assigned represents the consumer side. It is 
assumed that the regional household allocates its income to three expenditure 
categories: private household expenditures, government expenditures and sav
ings. Consumption of private household is depicted using a Constant Difference 
of Elasticities (CDE) function, the virtues of which is that budget shares vary with 
changes in income (e.g., the portion of income spent on food items declines as 
income rises). 
 A representative producer for each sector of a country or region makes 
production decisions to maximise profits by choosing inputs of labour, capital, 
and intermediates to produce a single sector output. Producers can substitute 
primary factors (labour and capital) for each other, and this substitution possibil
ity is captured using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) functional form. 
In the case of crop production, farmers also make decisions on land allocation. 
In addition, it is assumed that intermediate goods (goods produced by other 
sectors) are used in fixed proportions (Leontief) in manufacturing. Intermediate 
inputs are produced domestically or imported, while primary factors cannot 
move across country. Internationally traded commodities are assumed to be 
distinguished according to the region of origin. Using this socalled Armington 
assumption implies that, for example, wheat imported from the US is different 
from wheat imported from the EU, and trade flows in both varieties have their 
own price tag. A great advantage of the Armington assumption is that it allows 
us to model bilateral trade flows and bilateral trade policies. This feature allows 
us to model a preferential trade regime between the EU and India since trade 
flows between these two regions are distinguished from trade with other re
gions. 
 The GTAP model includes two global institutions. All transports between re
gions are carried out by the international transport sector. The trading costs re
flect the transaction costs involved in international trade, as well as the physical 
activity of transportation itself. Using transport inputs from all regions the inter
national transport sector minimises its costs under the CobbDouglas technol
ogy. The second global institution is the global bank, which takes the savings 
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from all regions and purchases investment goods in all regions depending on 
the expected rates of return. The global bank guarantees that global savings 
are equal to global investments.  
 Taxes are included in the theory of the model at several levels. Production 
taxes are placed on intermediate or primary inputs, or on output. Some trade 
taxes are modelled at the border. Additional internal taxes can be placed on 
domestic or imported intermediate inputs, and may be applied at differential 
rates that discriminate against imports. Trade policy instruments are repre
sented as import or export taxes/subsidies. A detailed discussion of the basic 
algebraic model structure of the GTAP model can be found in Hertel (1997), 
chapter 2. 
 The specific model used in this study is GTAPAGR (Keeney and Hertel, 
2005), a modified version of the standard GTAP model described above to ac
count for specific features of agricultural trade. Key features of GTAPAGR are: 
segmented factor markets, substitutability of intermediate inputs and crop
livestock interactions. 
 Segmented factor markets are included for labour and capital to account for 
empirically observed price differences between agricultural and nonagricultural 
sectors. This implies that in the model labour and capital can move freely within 
agricultural or within nonagricultural sectors, but are less easily shifted between 
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. This implies that differences in remu
neration can exist between the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors, which 
would not be possible if labour and capital were perfectly mobile. There is no 
need for a comparable assumption for land since land is only used by the agri
cultural sectors. 
 Substitutability of intermediate inputs is included for the agricultural sectors. 
In the standard GTAP model each unit of output requires a fixed amount of in
termediate inputs. This implies that even if prices would change no substitution 
between production factors and intermediate inputs occurs. In GTAPAGR there 
is a possibility to substitute between factors of production and intermediate in
puts. If, for example, labour costs increase it is thus possible to increase the 
use of herbicides etc. (which are intermediate inputs from the chemical industry) 
to save on labour time.1 
 Croplivestock interactions are included in GTAPAGR to account for shifts in 
the crops used for livestock feed when prices change. Empirical findings indi
cate the importance of accounting for these interactions, particularly in the EU. 
Note that, in the analysis, livestock consumption and production will alter only in 
                                                 
1 GTAPAGR furthermore allows for substitution between intermediate inputs. 
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response to the relative price changes induced by policy reform and related in
come effects, but not to economic growth or rising purchasing power as these 
are assumed constant.  
 
 
4.2 Measures of welfare impacts 
 
The macroeconomic effects of changes in policies are typically assessed by the 
wellestablished welfare economic compensation measure which is the measure 
that is used in this study. The socalled equivalent variation (EV) measures what 
change in income would be equivalent to the proposed policy change. In other 
words, the EV is the amount of income that should be given to (or taken away 
from) households to achieve a welfare that is similar to that which occurs when 
a ceRTAin policy change comes into effect. This measure always informs us 
about the potential welfare change and it does not inform us about distributive 
effects. In fact, if the EV is positive, we know that enough resources are mobi
lised such that the winners from the policy move can potentially compensate the 
losers. The EV is firmly grounded in the welfare economic literature, and pro
vides the ultimate measure of how well an economy is doing when implementing 
a policy change.1 In this study we will assess the two main drivers of the total 
welfare impact: allocative efficiency effects and terms of trade effects. 
 Allocative efficiency gains arise when, due to the removal of distortions, the 
factors of production (capital, labour and land) move more easily to their most 
efficient use, resulting in a (better approximation of the) optimal allocation of re
sources. The related productivity growth transfers into declining producer and 
consumer prices, and demand and supply expansion. In the process, global pat
terns of specialisation and trade change, as factors of production move in and 
out of countries and sectors. Estimated efficiency gains are useful indicators of 
the current depth of distortions per sector.  
 Terms of trade effects provide a summary measure that indicates the 
change in the ratio of prices received for exports and prices paid for imports. 
Declining terms of trade, i.e. a drop of export prices relative to import prices, 
often account negatively in the welfare evaluation. The intuition is that declining 
terms of trade represent a loss in the purchasing power of export. Note that in 
                                                 
1 While the EV takes the new situation as a reference, the alternative measure known as Compensat
ing Variation (CV) takes the old situation as the reference. It asks the hypothetical question: 'What is 
the minimum amount of compensation after the price change in order to be as well off as before the 
change?' 
 27 
the model, we assume perfect markets, so that we do not allow for any flaws in 
price transmission. 
 Terms of trade effects are a macroeconomic phenomenon, which ultimately 
reflect the changes in the country's real exchange rate. A negative term of trade 
effect generally, but not always, reflects a drop in factor prices (land, labour and 
capital) relative to a worldwide average of factor prices. To appreciate this fun
damentally macroeconomic phenomenon, it is useful to recall the basic defini
tion of the economy's external equilibrium, the balance of payments: 
 
 (XM)  (SI) = BoT + BoKA = BoP = 0. 
 
 The sum of the balance of trade, BoT, which is the difference between ex
ports, X, and imports M, plus the balance of capital, BoKA, which is the differ
ence between savings, S, and investments, I, must always be equal to zero. The 
balance of payments, BoP, always balances. 
 If a tariff cut is undertaken, imports will rise and this leads to a disequilibrium 
that must be resolved. Either exports must rise, or investments must rise, or 
savings must decline to restore the balance of payments. For ease of explana
tion we assume that investments and savings are fixed (although in the model 
this is not really so), so that adjustments have to occur by an expansion of ex
ports. The basic mechanism through which exports can be increased is a drop 
(or a less rapid rise) in export prices, which makes the country's products more 
attractive than other suppliers'. Generally it will be the domestic prices of pri
mary production factors, land, labour and capital that will bring about this fall in 
export prices. A depreciation of domestic factor prices then restores the bal
ance of payments.  
 Another mechanism through which the balance of payments (under certain 
circumstances) may be restored is through prices of intermediate inputs. If ini
tial levels of border protection are high, lowering border protection leads to 
price drops for imported intermediate inputs, and consequent substitution to
wards imported goods. The price drop for inputs, in turn, leads to lower produc
tion cost, which ultimately translates into lower prices for exported goods, 
hence depressing their terms of trade, but at the same time boosting export 
volumes. In these circumstances primary factor prices may rise as economic 
expansion leads to more demand for labour and other factors, while the drop in 
costs of imported intermediate inputs assures that balance is maintained on the 
balance of payments.  
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4.3 Model database and aggregation schemes 
 
The study is based on a new version of the GTAP database (Version 7, pre re
lease 2 of July 2007) with the following improvements over Version 6: 
- base year 2004 (was 2001 in Version 6): 2004 macroeconomic aggregates 
data from the World Bank augmented with data from published sources 
(World Development Report, CIA Factbook); 2004 bilateral trade data recon
ciled data from UN COMTRADE; 
- new regional classification (101 regions): This includes new inputoutput ta
bles for Nicaragua, Kazakhstan and Kyrgystan; updated IO tables for China, 
Indonesia, Chile, and Turkey; minor corrections on the IO tables for Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and France; 
- domestic support data: The 2004 domestic support data are available for 
the following OECD countries (Australia, Canada, European Union 15, Ice
land, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United 
States) as well as for China, Brazil, and South Africa; these data are com
bined with additional data on 2004 domestic support data for individual 
EU25 member countries; 
- agricultural export subsidy data: The dataset covers agricultural export sub
sidies as notified to the WTO for 2004 or the closest available year for 
European Union 25 (2002), Canada (2004), Israel (2003), Morocco (2002), 
Norway (2001), Panama (2003), Switzerland (2003), Tunisia (2002) and the 
United States (2002); 
- 2004 preferential tariffs data from Market Access Maps (MAcMaps): Com
bined data on ad valorem tariffs and the ad valorem equivalent of specific 
tariffs is incorporated in the data base; 
- estimates of the export tax equivalents of quotas on textile and wearing ap
parel exports to Canada, USA, and the EU15 under the Agreement on Tex
tiles and Clothing: for Canada and the EU15, the ETE estimates are for 
2003 and for the USA, the ETE estimates are for 2004; 
- improved data on trade in services from The Netherlands Bureau for Eco
nomic Policy Analysis (CPB). 
 
 A major limitation of using the Version 7 database is that the detailed tariff 
data from MAcMaps are not yet made available. This implies that the computa
tions of tariff reductions for the Doha scenario in the study rely on 2001 tariffs. 
The above advancements in the Version 7 database however outweigh this limi
tation in terms of tariffs. 
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Sector aggregation 
The GTAP database distinguishes 57 sectors, of which 12 are related to pri
mary agriculture and 8 to agrofood processing. Technically it is not possible to 
include all 57 sectors in the model and an aggregation therefore needs to be 
devised. The chosen aggregation reflects the focus of the study on agriculture 
and on India by keeping maximum detail in agricultural sectors while represent
ing nonagricultural sectors in a more aggregate manner. The result is a model 
aggregation with 25 sectors of which 12 represent primary agriculture, 8 agro
food industry and five sectors cover a broad range of nonagricultural sectors 
(table 4.1). 
 The industrial sectors are grouped under four headings: natural resource ex
traction, textiles and leather, labour intensive manufactures and capital intensive 
manufactures. Textiles are a recurring issue both in the WTO context and there
fore kept apart from the other industrial sectors. The grouping of manufactures 
based on the labour and capital use serves to trace possible different compara
tive advantages of the EU and India in terms of labour and capital. Finally, all 
services sectors are combined into a single sector. 
 
Region aggregation 
The GTAP database Version 7 distinguishes 101 regions. For technical reasons 
these have been grouped into 20 regions (Table 4.2). Policies and effects of 
countries or trade blocs can only be analysed sensibly if these countries or 
trade blocs are selected as individual groups. For example, by lumping Turkey 
and Norway together, the model will return results for a hypothetical country 
Turway (or Norkey) but will not allow one to assess the impact on each of these 
countries separately. 
 The study focuses on the implications of a potential bilateral agreement be
tween the EU and India. We take The Netherlands out of the EU27 aggregate 
(which thus reduces to a EU26 aggregate), as can be seen in table 4.2. This al
lows a more detailed assessment of the impact on the Netherlands, which is 
expected to differ from the aggregate EU effect due to the higher trade intensity 
in The Netherlands compared to the rest of the EU. Several key players in the 
agricultural markets are distinguished. 
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Table 4.1 Sector aggregation  
 Code Description GTAP sectors covered 
1 pdr Paddy rice Paddy rice 
2 wht Wheat Wheat 
3 gro Cereal grains nec a) Cereal grains nec 
4 v_f Vegetables, fruit, nuts Vegetables, fruit, nuts 
5 osd Oil seeds Oil seeds 
6 c_b Sugar cane, sugar beet Sugar cane, sugar beet 
7 pfb Plantbased fibres Plantbased fibres 
8 ocr Crops nec Crops nec 
9 ctl Cattle, sheep, goats, horses Cattle,sheep,goats,horses 
10 oap Animal products nec Animal products nec 
11 rmk Raw milk Raw milk 
12 wol Wool, silkworm cocoons Wool, silkworm cocoons 
13 cmt 
Meat: cattle, sheep, goats, 
horse Meat: cattle,sheep,goats,horse 
14 omt Meat products nec Meat products nec 
15 vol Vegetable oils and fats Vegetable oils and fats 
16 mil Dairy products Dairy products 
17 pcr Processed rice Processed rice 
18 sgr Sugar Sugar 
19 ofd Food products nec Food products nec 
20 b_t 
Beverages and tobacco  
products Beverages and tobacco products 
21 Extract Natural resources extraction 
Forestry; Fishing; Coal; Oil; Gas; 
Minerals nec 
22 TexLea Textiles and leather 
Textiles; Wearing apparel; Leather 
products 
23 
Lab
Man Labour intensive manufactures 
Wood products; Paper products, 
publishing; Metal products; Motor 
vehicles and parts; Transport 
equipment nec 
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Table 4.1 Sector aggregation (cont.) 
 Code Description GTAP sectors covered 
24 
Cap
Man Capital intensive manufactures 
Petroleum, coal products; Chemi
cal, rubber, plastic prods; Mineral 
products nec; Ferrous metals; 
Metals nec; Electronic equipment; 
Machinery and equipment nec; 
Manufactures nec 
25 Svces Services and activities NES Electricity; Gas manufacture, dis
tribution; Water; Construction; 
Trade; Transport nec; Sea trans
port; Air transport; Communication; 
Financial services nec; Insurance; 
Business services nec; Recreation 
and other services; PubAd
min/Defence/Health/Educat; Dwell
ings 
a) nec = not elsewhere classified. 
 
 In order to assess the impact of trade liberalisation on the main trade blocks 
we distinguish MERCOSUR, ASEAN, GCC and the EuroMed countries. Another 
key group is formed by the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which are gener
ally exempted from any trade liberalisation in the WTO context. The regions 17
20 in the model gather the remaining countries on the basis of geographical 
considerations. Compared to the other groups these groups comprise a rather 
mixed bunch of countries. 
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Table 4.2 Region aggregation 
 Code Description GTAP regions covered 
1 NLD Netherlands Netherlands 
2 USA 
United States  
of America United States of America 
3 CAN Canada Canada 
4 JPN Japan Japan 
5 KOR Korea Korea 
6 CHK 
China and  
Hong Kong China; Hong Kong 
7 IND India India 
8 RUS 
Russian  
Federation Russian Federation 
9 BOL Bolivia Bolivia 
10 EU26 
European  
Union 
Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Den
mark; Estonia; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; 
Hungary; Ireland; Italy; Latvia; Lithuania; Luxem
bourg; Malta; Poland; Portugal; Slovakia; Slovenia; 
Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom; Bulgaria;  
Romania 
11 OCN 
Australia, New  
Zealand, XOC Australia; New Zealand; Rest of Oceania 
12 MERC MERCOSUR Argentina; Brazil; Paraguay; Uruguay; Venezuela 
13 ASEAN ASEAN 
Cambodia; Indonesia; Malaysia; Philippines; Singa
pore; Thailand; Viet Nam; Rest of Southeast Asia 
14 XWS 
Rest of  
Western Asia Rest of Western Asia 
15 MED EUROMED Egypt; Morocco; Tunisia; Rest of North Africa. 
16 LDC LDCs 
Bangladesh; Rest of South Asia; Nicaragua;  
Senegal; Rest of Western Africa; Central Africa; 
South Central Africa; Madagascar; Malawi;  
Mozambique; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Rest of 
Eastern Africa; Rest of South African Customs 
17 RAF Rest of Africa 
Nigeria; Mauritius; Zimbabwe; Botswana;  
South Africa 
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Table 4.2 Region aggregation (cont.) 
 Code Description GTAP regions covered 
18 RAS Rest of Asia Taiwan; Rest of East Asia; Pakistan; Sri Lanka 
19 RAM 
Rest of  
South America 
Mexico; Chile; Colombia; Ecuador; Peru; Rest of South 
America; Rest of Central America 
20 ROW Rest of World 
Rest of North America; Caribbean; Switzerland; Rest of 
EFTA; Albania; Croatia; Rest of Eastern Europe; Rest of 
Europe; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyztan; Rest of Former Soviet 
Union; Iran Islamic Republic of; Turkey 
 
 
4.4 Scenarios 
 
In order to analyse the potential gains from an EU  India FTA we need to define 
scenarios describing the contents of such an agreement. From the theoretical 
literature on FTAs discussed in chapter 2 we know that we are operating within 
the boundaries of the theory of the secondbest. The impact of a FTA is am
biguous; the outcome of the opposing forces of trade creation and trade diver
sion needs to be assessed empirically. This outcome may depend on the 
degree of liberalisation undertaken within the FTA, as shown for a FTA between 
the EU and South Africa (McDonald and Walmsley, 2004). 
 Next to the degree of liberalisation we know from existing FTAs that non
agricultural liberalisation is generally more ambitious than liberalisation of agri
cultural trade. We therefore separately assess the impact of nonagricultural 
from liberalisation of all sectors. 
 McDonald and Walmsley (2004) find disincentives to liberalisation of agricul
tural trade by the EU within a FTA. They hypothesise that these disincentives 
may be reduced by global liberalisation of agricultural trade. Such a global lib
eralisation could be achieved through a WTO agreement in the current Doha 
round, depending on whether any agreed upon reductions would reduce actual 
protection of the agricultural sectors. 
 Based on these considerations we design four scenarios: (i) nonagricultural 
liberalisation, (ii) liberalisation of all trade, (iii) nonagricultural liberalisation when 
a Doha agreement is in place and (iv) liberalisation of all trade when a Doha 
agreement is in place. Each of these scenarios entails a series of experiments 
to explore the impact of differing degrees of liberalisation by the EU and India. 
More specific we increase liberalisation from 0 to 100 in steps of 10% for the 
 34 
EU and India and compute the result for all possible combinations. This implies a 
series of 120 experiments or model runs by scenario1. Using this set of scenar
ios we can explore the incentives to (partially) liberalise for the EU and India. 
 
(i) Nonagricultural liberalisation 
The first series of experiments explores the incentives for nonagricultural trade 
liberalisation. This involves liberalising trade in the sectors natural resource ex
traction, textiles and leather, labour intensive manufactures, capital intensive 
manufactures and services. This liberalisation is done on the basis of results 
from a base run used to update the 2004 data in terms of the agreement on 
textiles and clothing and decoupling of support following the midterm review of 
the CAP. 
 
(ii) Nonagricultural and agricultural trade liberalisation 
The second series of experiments explores the incentives for agricultural trade 
liberalisation (i.e. in all sectors not included in the previous scenario), while as
suming nonagricultural trade liberalisation is occurring.  
 In all experiments (including those in the nonagricultural trade liberalisation) 
we fixed the exports of the sector Meat (cattle, sheep, goats, horse) from India 
to the EU26 and the Netherlands. The database indicates a sizeable initial flow 
of exports from India for this sector highly protected by the EU. Looking in more 
detail at the COMTRADE data on which the GTAP data are based we indeed find 
significant exports under the HS code 0202030 (Boneless bovine cuts, frozen). 
However, the data look rather suspicious with the destination each year switch
ing between different EU countries. Since large exports of bovine meat from In
dia is rather surprising we crosschecked the data in the COMEXT database 
which contains more detailed EU reports of imports and exports. There we 
found no trace of this trade flow indicating that this is most likely a case of re
exports, i.e. a product transferred through a European port to a nonEuropean 
destination. Since we are not able to determine where this trade flow is actually 
heading, we fixed it at the base run levels and excluded this sector in the agri
cultural trade liberalisations. If we would not make this adjustment to the model 
the changes in this sector would completely dominate all model results, which 
appears extremely unrealistic. 
 
                                                 
1 With such a number of experiments total solution time can take up to 7 hours. This is the main rea
son for using GTAPAGR which is significantly faster than the more elaborate LEITAP model developed 
at LEI for which a single run can take 7 hours.  
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Table 4.3 Specification of simulated Doha agreement 
 Developed Developing (excluding LDCs) 
Agriculture   
 export com
 petition 
Elimination of export subsidies Elimination of export subsidies 
 domestic 
 support 
All countries 48.5% reduction in 
AMS, except for US and Japan 
(60% cut) and EU (70% cut) 
All countries 32.3% reduction in 
AMS 
- market  
 access 
Tiered formula with 4 bands and 
linear cuts 
 
Tiered formula with 4 bands and 
linear cuts 
 Threshold Cut Threshold Cut 
 0 < 20 50 0 < 30 33.3 
 20  50 57.5 30  80 38.3 
  50  75 63.5 80  130 42.3 
 > 75 69.5 > 130 46.3 
Manufacturing   
- market  
 access 
Swiss 10 formula: average of 
50% reduction of tariffs, maxi
mum tariff 10%  
Swiss 20 formula: average of 
33% reduction of tariffs, maxi
mum tariff 20%  
 
Multilateral and bilateral trade liberalisation (scenario [iii] and [iv]) 
Based on the hypothesis of McDonald and Walmsley (2004) that multilateral lib
eralisation may change the incentive for agricultural liberalisation in a FTA, the 
third scenario again assesses the scope for agricultural liberalisation, assuming 
nonagricultural trade liberalisation is occurring. In contrast to the second sce
nario, however, we now do not start from the base run but instead from a situa
tion in which a successful Doha agreement has been implemented. 
 To this end we simulate a Doha agreement with data from the base run. This 
Doha agreement is based on the state of play in the WTO agreements in July 
2007 (see table 4.3). In case a range was mentioned in proposals for tariff re
ductions we took a simple average of these. Based on these Doha results we 
then recompute the range of shocks corresponding to increased liberalisation 
by the EU and India in steps of 10% and rerun the experiments for both the lib
eralisation of nonagricultural trade (scenario [iii]) and liberalisation of all trade 
(scenario [iv]). Comparison with the first set of scenarios indicates whether a 
more or less realistic multilateral agreement changes the incentives within a 
FTA.  
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5 Simulation results 
 
 
The model simulations aim at uncovering trade creation and trade diversion ef
fects with a possible EU  India FTA to derive policy implications from these. The 
first part of this chapter addresses the welfare evaluation for the EU and India, 
which provides a summary measure of the aggregate impacts. This is followed 
by a discussion on withincountry impact in India.  
 
 
5.1 Nonagricultural liberalisation 
 
The first set of simulations assessed the impact of nonagricultural liberalisation 
by the EU and India. Running 120 combinations of different degrees of liberali
sation we find a rather different pattern of the welfare (EV) changes for the EU 
and India. Each figure presents the changes in welfare as a surface. Each colour 
of the surface indicates a range of welfare changes. For example, in figure 5.1 
the yellow indicates negative welfare changes of between 0 and 0.01% of GDP 
in the EU27, whereas the lightest green indicates a welfare gain of between 0 
and 0.005% of GDP. The squares on the surface are based on the axes indicat
ing the amount of liberalisation undertaken by the EU and India. If we follow the 
right hand side of the surface we are looking at the impact of zero liberalisation 
by the EU and increasing liberalisation (from 0 to 100 in steps of 10%) by India. 
Both the colours (greens and blues) and the upward sloping line indicate increas
ing welfare for the EU when India liberalises nonagricultural trade with the EU. 
Similarly, following the bottom of the surface we are looking at zero liberalisa
tion by India and increasing liberalisation by the EU. The colour shift from green 
to yellow and a downward sloping line both indicate a loss in welfare for the EU 
if it is the only one liberalising. 
 
5.1.1 Total welfare impacts 
 
The colours in the two graphs point to a rather different impact of a FTA con
fined to nonagricultural liberalisation. The EU gains in about all combinations of 
degrees of liberalisation, expect when it is the only one liberalising or if it liberal
ises almost fully when India restricts its liberalisation to 20%. India on the other 
hand faces loses in the majority of cases. Exceptions are cases where there is 
a limited liberalisation in India (less than 60% and then full liberalisation in the EU 
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is needed to maintain a positive welfare impact), coupled with moderate to full 
liberalisation by the EU. 
 
Figure 5.1 Simulated welfare impacts of nonagricultural liberalisation 
on EU 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Simulated welfare impacts of nonagricultural liberalisa
tion on India 
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Figure 5.3 Simulated welfare impacts of nonagricultural liberali
sation on the Netherlands 
 
 
 Apart from a more often negative impact on India, the size of the impact is 
also more pronounced than in case of the EU. In the EU the impact does not ex
ceed 0.02% of GDP when India unilaterally fully liberalises trade. This scenario 
would however imply an annual 0.30% loss of GDP for India. At the other ex
treme, a full and unilateral liberalisation by the EU results in a loss of 0.003% for 
the EU and a gain of 0.14% of GDP for India. Although the gains and losses 
measured in dollars are larger in the EU (the maximum gain for the EU would be 
a little over 3 billion US dollars), the sheer size of the EU economy reduces their 
overall impact on the EU economy. 
 In figure 5.3 we present the aggregate welfare impacts on the Netherlands. 
The overall picture is very similar to the EU as whole. The most notable differ
ence is that the (yellow) area with loss of welfare is smaller in the case of the 
Netherlands. This is in line with other studies of the impact of trade liberalisation 
finding a more beneficial impact on the Netherlands compared to the EU as a 
whole. A key reason is the prominent role of Dutch transport sectors in global 
trade. This implies that the increase in trade volume occurring when trade is lib
eralised benefits the Dutch economy trough an increased demand for transport 
services. 
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 Graphs 5.1 and 5.2 clearly indicate that there are opposite interests in non
agricultural trade liberalisation. Assuming that a feasible agreement needs to 
provide for gains for both the EU and India we can identify the part of the wel
fare surface where welfare increases in both regions.  
 
Figure 5.4 Welfare impacts of nonagricultural liberalisation on EU 
restricted to positive gains for both EU and India 
 
 
 Note however that the net impact of the FTA on the EU and India is positive 
at all times, i.e. in all scenarios the country losing from liberalisation could be 
compensated by the other country. Although this total welfare gain provides a 
strong theoretical motivation for liberalising trade, in practice compensation is 
hard to implement. Identifying the area where both EU and India experience a 
gain in welfare may thus aid in identifying the political scope for an agreement.  
 The areas with positive gains for both countries still reveal opposing inter
ests of the EU (figure 5.4) and India (figure 5.5). Comparing figure 5.4 and 5.5 
we find that if nonagricultural liberalisation scenario is required to yield positive 
gains for both the EU and India, the maximum liberalisation of India is 70% in 
which case the EU needs to liberalise by 100% to yield a positive welfare impact 
in India. Although this scenario also yields the highest welfare increase for the 
EU, India would experience the highest welfare gains when restricting its own 
liberalisation to 30%. These findings suggest that an asymmetric agreement 
with the EU liberalising more than India could be rational in economic terms.  
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Figure 5.5 Welfare impacts of nonagricultural liberalisation on India 
restricted to positive gains for both EU and India 
 
 
 The finding that full liberalisation does not generate the highest welfare in
creases points to the presence of trade diversion effects. These appear to be 
more significant for India based on the larger areas in figure 5.2 with negative 
welfare impacts. Given the structure of the initial tariffs (Table 3.1) this is no 
surprising result. India has high initial tariffs on nonagricultural goods (about 
17% on average as opposed to 1.9% for the EU) and is therefore more likely to 
experience trade diversion effects when more efficient suppliers are sidelined 
when preferential tariffs are granted to the EU. The positive and consistently 
upward sloping surface for the EU indicates that in case of the EU trade crea
tion effects dominate in all scenarios. In case of India there are areas where 
trade creation effects dominate (the green areas in figure 5.2) and areas where 
trade diversion effects dominate (the orange areas). 
 
5.1.2 Allocative efficiency and terms of trade effects for India 
 
Total welfare effects for India are determined by allocative efficiency effects and 
terms of trade effects. To understand which of these causes the change in the 
total welfare impacts we graph each of these two forces. 
 Figure 5.6 depicts welfare changes following changes in terms of trade. As 
is common in CGE models using the Armington assumption to model bilateral 
trade, the terms of trade effects account for a large part of the total welfare 
0
50
100
0 20 4
0 60 8
0 10
0
-0.02
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
Total welfare 
impact in India 
(% GDP)
Non-
agricultural  
liberalization 
by the EU 
Non-agricultural 
liberalization by India 
0.12-0.14
0.1-0.12
0.08-0.1
0.06-0.08
0.04-0.06
0.02-0.04
0-0.02
 41 
impact. The terms of trade effect however does not appear to be able to ac
count for the curved surface of the total welfare impact. The surface is a more 
or less flat surface due to a monotone increase in terms of trade effects when 
the EU liberalises and a monotone decrease if India liberalises. Base on figure 
5.6 we can conclude that the terms of trade effects shift the total welfare ef
fects up and down but do not greatly affect the shape of the total welfare sur
face. 
 
Figure 5.6 Terms of trade welfare impacts of nonagricultural 
liberalisation for India 
 
 
 We then turn to the allocative efficiency effects for an explanation of the 
shape of the total welfare effects for India (figure 5.7). We find that liberalisation 
by the EU has a positive impact on the allocative efficiency in India: the line 
through zero trade liberalisation by India monotonically increases when the EU 
increases its liberalisation. For liberalisation by India we find a nonlinear relation
ship with allocative efficiency. This nonlinear relationship demonstrates the op
posing impacts of trade creation and trade diversion that prohibit an 
unambiguous conclusion on the impact of a regional trade agreement. At first 
the trade creation effects of the FTA dominate but as India increases its liberali
sation of nonagricultural trade with the EU trade diversion starts to dominate. At 
around 30% liberalisation by India trade diversions starts to balance trade crea
tion, with 60% liberalisation trade diversion effects are dominating allocative ef
ficiency effects. Note again that the net impacts of the FTA remains positive 
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despite the losses for India since the EU gains when India liberalises (see figure 
5.1). 
 
Figure 5.7 Allocative efficiency welfare impacts of nonagricultural 
liberalisation for India 
 
 
 The total allocative efficiency effects are the sum of changes in each of the 
sectors. Figure 5.8 presents the allocative efficiency results by sector (in million 
USD) to assess which sectors are the main contributors to the total impact for 
India. Capital intensive manufacturing and natural resource extraction clearly 
dominate the effects in the other sectors. These two sectors show an increase 
in allocative efficiency up to 30% of liberalisation by India, after which trade di
version starts to dominate turning into a negative impact in between 50 and 
60% liberalisation by India. Both sectors are capital intensive and therefore 
sourcing these from the EU is in line with the comparative advantages of both 
regions. The results in figure 5.8 indicate this intuition only holds to a certain ex
tent since the EU apparently is not the most efficient supplier of capital intensive 
goods in the world economy and thus trade diversion starts to dominate the 
trade creation effects.  
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Figure 5.8 Allocative efficiency welfare impacts of nonagricultural lib
eralisation for India by sector 
 
 
5.1.3 Key findings from nonagricultural trade liberalisation 
 
The analysis of the impact of nonagricultural trade liberalisation between the EU 
and India illustrates that not all FTAs need to be welfare enhancing. This finding 
is in line with the theoretical analyses of FTAs pointing to opposing trade crea
tion and trade diversion effects. The analysis also points to opposing interests 
of the EU and India. Whereas it would be welfare maximising of both to strive for 
complete liberalisation by the EU of nonagricultural trade, there are opposing 
interests in terms of liberalisation by India. Assuming that any political feasible 
agreement needs to yield positive welfare impacts for both, India's liberalisation 
would be in between 30 and 70%, with the lower number maximising India's wel
fare. 
 The results also illustrate that although terms of trade effects are important 
for the size of the total welfare impact, the allocative efficiency effect deter
mines the surface of the total welfare effects. Assessing sector level results we 
find these results to be driven by two capital intensive sectors: natural resource 
extraction and capital intensive manufacturing. 
 
 
5.2 Agricultural and nonagricultural trade liberalisation 
 
Analysis of trade liberalisation between the EU and India indicated a welfare loss 
in case of full liberalisation. This raises the question whether including agricul
ture in the agreement would change these findings. We therefore ran a set of 
simulations assuming full nonagricultural liberalisation coupled with different 
levels of agricultural liberalisation. In none of the simulations agricultural liberali
sation was able to offset the negative impacts of nonagricultural liberalisation 
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for India. We therefore ran a new set of simulations 'optimising' nonagricultural 
liberalisation for India (i.e. full liberalisation by the EU and 30% liberalisation by 
India) combined with different combinations of agricultural liberalisation by both 
the EU and India. 
 
5.2.1 Total welfare impacts 
 
Using the 'optimal' nonagricultural trade liberalisation for India as a base sce
nario, figure 5.9 and 5.10 present the welfare surfaces when EU  India agricul
tural trade is liberalised as well. In both cases there are net welfare gains of the 
combination of agricultural and nonagricultural liberalisation. However, rather 
different patterns emerge. 
 In case of the EU adding agricultural trade liberalisation to the mix always in
creases total welfare, whereas for India liberalising agricultural trade more than 
the EU could generate net welfare impacts less than for only nonagricultural lib
eralisation (this is visible in figure 5.10 with some parts of the India's surface be
ing below the point of zero agricultural trade liberalisation). The incentives for 
agricultural trade liberalisation for India thus depend on the actions of the EU, 
whereas for the EU agricultural trade liberalisation with India always yields a net 
gain (its welfare surface is always above the point of zero agricultural trade lib
eralisation).  
 
Figure 5.9 Total welfare impacts of agricultural liberalisation for EU27 
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Figure 5.10 Total welfare impacts of agricultural liberalisation for 
India 
 
 
 Although the EU always experiences a net gain in welfare its gains increase 
nonlinearly with increasing liberalisation by India. It would thus be in the EU's in
terest to aim for full agricultural liberalisation by India. This conflicts with India's 
interest, which would be to reduce its own agricultural trade liberalisation to 
zero and aim for full agricultural trade liberalisation by the EU; India's gains rap
idly increase with the level of liberalisation by the EU, whereas they decline with 
increasing levels of own liberalisation. 
 The total welfare gains for the EU show an interesting saddlelike pattern. Al
though the EU experiences a net gain at every level of liberalisation, the mar
ginal benefits of liberalisation first increase rapidly, peaking at between 70 and 
80% liberalisation, following by a rapid decrease in marginal benefits. This is a 
similar shape as found by McDonald and Walmsley (2004) for a FTA between 
the EU and SouthAfrica, although they found the 'optimal' level of liberalisation 
to be at about 40%.  
 
5.2.2 Terms of trade and allocative efficiency impacts in the EU 
 
Assessing the drivers of the pattern in total welfare for the EU we find no simple 
answer. Figure 5.11 and 5.12 present the surfaces of the terms of trade and al
locative efficiency contributions to total welfare. Neither of these resembles the 
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surface of the total welfare impact, although the terms of trade effects appear 
to be the determining factor. 
 Allocative efficiency effects in the EU are hardly affected by India's liberalisa
tion, but do increase with increasing liberalisation by the EU. These strong in
creases coupled with the limited decreases in terms of trade effects account for 
the increasing part of the total welfare gains for the EU. The terms of trade ef
fects show a fast decline in welfare for the EU with increasing own liberalisation. 
This decline is only to a limited extent offset by increasing liberalisation of India. 
Given the total welfare impacts the negative terms of trade effects start domi
nating the positive allocative efficiency effects at around 80% liberalisation by 
the EU. The decreasing rate of efficiency welfare gains, combined with the in
creasing rate of decline of terms of trade effects, accounts for the sharp drop 
in total welfare impacts on the EU. 
 The role of the terms of trade effect in CGE analyses is the subject of a con
tinuing debate on the analysis of trade agreements. Brown (1987) found that 
these terms of trade effects are the result of a CESbased Armington specifica
tion. The implicit assumption is that each region has some monopoly power due 
to distinguishing goods by origin. In the current setting the assumption that pol
icy choices affect prices does not appear unrealistic since both the EU and India 
are significant players in the global economy. Whether the size of the terms of 
trade effect is realistic is an empirical question depending on the size of the 
substitution elasticities in the demand functions for imports. In the model for this 
study we employed the standard elasticities included in the GTAP database. 
These are based on econometric estimations using 1999 data (see Hertel et al., 
2004 for details). Due to data scarcity elasticities are not region specific, which 
appears an unrealistic assumption. Given the lack of empirical studies it is hard 
to determine ex ante which elasticities to use. 
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Figure 5.11 Terms of trade welfare impacts of agricultural liberalisa
tion for EU7 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Allocative efficiency welfare impacts of agricultural 
liberalisation for EU27 
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5.2.3 Key findings from agricultural trade liberalisation 
 
Agricultural trade liberalisation is found to generate benefits although of a lim
ited scale: the negative impact for India of a full liberalisation of nonagricultural 
trade can not be compensated by agricultural trade liberalisation. We therefore 
run a set of agricultural simulations based on the 'optimal' liberalisation of non
agricultural trade from India's perspective (100% by the EU and 30% by India). 
Results indicate limited benefits for India from its own liberalisation, which con
trast with significant benefits from EU agricultural liberalisation. Depending on 
the extent to which the EU liberalises agricultural trade, India may be better off 
with only (partially) liberalising agricultural trade  even limiting reform to a 20% 
cut.  
 Benefits for the EU increase with increasing liberalisation of agricultural 
trade by India and are always more than only nonagricultural trade liberalisation. 
We do however find decreasing marginal benefits of agricultural trade liberalisa
tion beyond 80% for the EU, due to negative terms of trade effects for the EU. 
The incentive for the EU to limit its own agricultural trade liberalisation is due to 
large country optimal tariff effects. These disincentives are likely to be reduced 
by a global round of liberalisation, as aimed for in the current Doha negotiations.  
 Thus we arrive at a selection of four 'optimal' solutions out of the 240 simu
lations on which the welfare discussions were based, presented in table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1  Income effects under 'optimal' scenarios a) 
Scenarios: (Depth of liberalisation in% under selected scenarios) 
 India maximises gains EU maximises 
gains 
 only non
agricultural 
non
agricultural b) 
& agricultural 
only non
agricultural 
nonagricultural 
b) & agricultural 
EU tariff cut on  
imports from India 
100 100 100 80 
India tariff cut on  
imports from EU 
30 20 70 100 
Simulated effects (% of GDP) 
EU 0.002 0.002 0.011 0.005 
India 0.126 0.209 0.017 0.145 
a) Welfare effects based on the equivalent variation measure; b) Agricultural liberalisation scenarios combined 
with nonagricultural liberalisation scenario EU_100/India_30. 
Source: model simulations. 
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 For the nonagricultural liberalisation scenarios the 'optimal' solutions are: 
100% liberalisation by the EU coupled with 30% and 70% liberalisation by India. 
For the agricultural liberalisation scenarios these are: 100% by the EU with 20% 
by India (India's 'optimum') and 80% by the EU and 100% by India (EU's opti
mum). 
 
 
5.3 Within country effects of trade liberalisation: India 
 
The discussion so far focused on welfare impacts as indicators of economic 
impact. Several analysts criticise the reliance on welfare indicators for policy 
purposes, particularly in a developing country context. Notably, Taylor and Von 
Arnim (2005) argue that these welfare measures by definition are small and 
therefore of limited interest but hazardous in hiding possibly large distribution 
effects. Welfare gains for a country as a whole may imply that some sectors or 
groups in society lose whereas others gain. Welfare measures and global eco
nomic models that produce them are particularly useful in understanding drivers 
of change in employment and wages. On another level, the distribution of bene
fits within a country is of key impoRTAnce in political decisions on trade agree
ments. Although in theory a net welfare gain for a country implies that the 
winners could compensate the losers, such compensation appears to be diffi
cult to arrange in practice. Furthermore, differences in political power of sector 
or societal groups are reflected in the decision making. If powerful groups stand 
to lose from a potential trade agreement such an agreement is less likely to ma
terialise.  
 In the following we therefore present some key country level results: prices 
of production factors, sectoral output and trade flows. To keep the presentation 
legible we need to select a number of simulations from the 240 runs on which 
the welfare discussions were based. For the nonagricultural liberalisation sce
narios we take the two 'optimal' solutions: 100% liberalisation by the EU coupled 
with 30% and 70% liberalisation by India. For the agricultural liberalisation sce
narios we take the 100% by the EU with 20% by India (India's 'optimum') and 
80% by the EU and 100% by India (EU's optimum). As before the two agricul
tural scenarios are run on the basis of full EU and 30% reduction by India in the 
nonagricultural sector. 
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5.3.1 Factors of production 
 
Price changes serve as transmission mechanisms in bringing about changes to 
the economic structure after a reform of policies. An FTA works directly on in
ternational prices (export prices, import prices and the terms of trade), which 
have effects on domestic prices as the goods and factor markets of production 
adjust. The depth of the perturbations in the economic system in India and the 
EU indicates the possible economic impact of a trade agreement between the 
regions.  
 Of particular interest are the effects on the returns to labour (skilled and un
skilled), capital (credit) and land, i.e. the factors of production. According to a 
generic setup of multisector models, changes in the economic structure after 
policy reform are driven for a large part by alterations to the relative returns of 
labour, capital and land in each economic activity. In the model we assume that 
in equilibrium the factor prices correspond to their return. Shifts in the overall 
factor prices correspond to structure changes in the overall economy. 
 From that perspective, figure 5.13 is particularly informative on the asym
metric impact of the EU  India trade agreement in EU and India. The leftmost 
panel shows that overall factor prices in the EU are unaffected across the set of 
policy scenarios, with the exception of declining land prices under an agricul
tureinclusive FTA. We conclude that the EU economy remains essentially unper
turbed by integration with India. This observation confirms the smallish scope 
for welfare gains to be had in the EU. In turn, India's integration with the EU will 
induce economic change, as flagged by developments in Indian factor prices. 
Moreover, the economic impact varies substantially with the depth of the FTA. 
Given that the stakes in an FTA are much greater and more varied for India than 
the EU, we take the Indian perspective in the remainder of this section. 
 Factor prices in India show a tendency to rise, for almost all factors in all 
scenarios. Factor price rises under a manufacturesbased FTA are in the order 
of 0.2 to 0.6%, and rather uniform but with wages rising more than the prices of 
land and capital  in particular for unskilled labour. A modest rise in land prices 
points to some repercussions for the agriculture sector, in particular to an ex
pansion of the area under cultivation. Interestingly, under an agricultureinclusive 
agreement, land prices respond quite dramatically with increases of over 1 to 
2%. In combination with a minor increase or drop in skilled wages and capital 
prices these are signs of an economic restructuring away from industrial pro
duction and towards agriculture and labourintensive manufacturing.  
 One further remark is appropriate before we describe the impact on the 
economic structure, in terms of trade and output. Factor price developments 
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provide indications of the equity effects of a trade reform. India features wide
spread poverty and unemployment. It is widely agreed that the most vulnerable 
groups in society are landless rural workers and the urban unemployed. Access 
to a formal or informal job position provides the best outlook for a move out of 
poverty. Hence, from a povertyreducing perspective we are particularly inter
ested in a trade policy that boosts the demand for unskilled labour. However, 
there is wide acceptance that economic growth per se, if constant at a high rate 
for a longer period of time, is an ideal condition for poverty reduction in the long 
run. By implication, an ideal trade policy strikes contributes to increased em
ployment on the short term and strong growth in the long run. 
 The simulation results point to the possible inconsistency between a trade 
policy geared at strong growth and a policy for job creation cum poverty reduc
tion. If India concludes a trade agreement with the EU, the welfaremaximising 
policy  given full liberalisation by the EU  is to open up manufactures trade by 
30% and agricultural trade by 20%. However, such a policy would create large 
rents for land owners while having a limited (yet positive) pull on unskilled la
bour. The greatest gains to landless and urban labourers, and possibly the big
gest poverty alleviating effects, are achieved under a 70% liberalisation of 
manufactures trade, leaving agricultural protection at the status quo. This policy 
maximises unskilled labour demand in textiles, pushing wages by 0.6%, but the 
welfare gains approach nil due to strong trade diversion effects. These are indi
cations that trade policies in India feature a tradeoff between welfare maximisa
tion  a proxy for a stronggrowth policy  and poverty alleviation, pressing the 
need for the government of India to strike a balance between these potentially 
conflicting goals. 
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Figure 5.13 Factor price changes in EU and India under various  
scenarios 
 
 
5.3.2 India's opening up to manufactures 
 
Under a 30% cut of applied protection, manufactures imports from EU into India 
expand strongly. To a large extent this trade, both labour intensive (light) manu
factures and capital intensive manufactures (durable consumer goods but also 
capital goods), replaces imports from other regions of the regions, as reflected 
in reductions in imports from the rest of the world. 
 
Trade 
The simulations suggest that the EU  India agreement will be particularly in
strumental in promoting India's imports of capital intensive manufactures from 
the EU (appendix tables A1.3 to A1.6 provide detail on trade effects under vari
ous FTA scenarios). This comes to no surprise as the EU accounts for 25% of 
all imports of such industrial goods already, and the FTA strongly improves the 
competitive position of EU exporters visàvis exporters in the rest of the world. 
Under the FTA, some exports from the EU exporters replace exports from other 
exporters. However, in volume terms the expansion of exports from the EU ex
ceeds the decline in exports from countries in the rest of world outside the 
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positive effect, for capital intensive manufactures could amount to USD 1.4 bil
lion under a 100/30 cut and USD 3.1 billion USD under a 100/70 cut. Such re
sults indicate the possible scope of the deepening economic integration 
between India and the EU.  
 EU exporters of manufactures fare well under such a policy change, as they 
see the EU market share in total Indian imports rise substantially  to 39% for 
labour intensive manufactures and 27% for capital intensive manufactures (table 
A.4).  
 If we assume, as the model does, that the total balance of payments is 
fixed, then the currencies to afford rising imports need to be collected by 
means of an expansion of exports.1 There is an important limitation of this 
model setup for the analysis of a free trade agreement: by and large, both part
ners of the agreement are to obtain equivalent trade expansion.2 The results 
suggest that India depends largely on textile exports to the EU, which double in 
all simulations. Exports of other manufactures also expand, but not as dramati
cally. 
 The doubling of India's textile exports into the EU is the result of the en
hanced competitiveness of Indian garments visàvis competitors, particularly 
Chinese make. Is it likely that the FTA will have such a booming impact? Prime 
evidence comes from a view of the depth of the FTA and trade shares of Indian 
garments. Before the FTA, EU levied an average 7.2% tariff (ad valorem equiva
lent) on textiles imports from India, substantially higher than the 4.4% average 
for all importers. In the scenarios under scrutiny, the EU completely eliminates 
the tariff on Indian garments, and measures for other exporters remain the 
same. Thus, in such a setting Indian exporters jump from a disadvantageous 
base to a preference margin visàvis competitors exceeding 4%. In a setting of 
pricebased competition, such a policy change is a potentially strong driver of 
trade growth  particularly if India's textile sector is not the global leastcost 
producer. The plausibility of the projected boost of Indian textile exports into the 
EU is further improved by a limited initial share of Indian garments in EU im
                                                 
1 Actually, India is running a structural deficit on the trade balance, which implies that India finances a 
surplus of imports over exports with incoming capital flows. 
2 The terms of trade with trading partners outside the agreement change only in as far as the FTA af
fects domestic factor markets in EU and India and the transmission of these effects into prices for 
tradables  apart from effects via commodity markets where either India or EU are price setters and 
the FTA affects the trading price. In contrast, under a global trade reform the terms of trade will 
change with all trading partners a priori because of the uneven distribution of the global cut. This im
plies large scope for adjustments to the pattern of international specialisation. 
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ports. The doubling of imports from India to the EU represents no more than a 
rise in the share of all imports to 2% (Table A.3). 
 A FTA makes economic sense when it allows a further integration between 
two 'natural' trading partners. A prime test is whether the trade integration re
sults in a more productive allocation of resources across both trading partners.  
 The results indicate that the opening up of EU markets for Indian goods cre
ates very little scope for allocative efficiency gains in India. There are some 
gains in textiles, but the output effect is limited, and the adjustment in the tex
tiles industry is not much more than a reorientation of trade from restofworld 
destinations towards the EU. Moreover, the efficiency gains evaporate under 
deeper cuts; as India slashes more than 50% tariffs on imports of EU origin, 
trade diversion effects and associated efficiency losses start to kick in. By im
plication, an EU  India FTA provides few leads for achieving major efficiency 
gains via adjustments to the pattern of international specialisation; most proba
bly India can find more suitable FTA partners. 
 Terms of trade effects dominate the welfare analysis for India in most of the 
simulations. There is ample scope for terms of trade gains when EU opens up 
but this scope disappears as India liberalises its own trade policies. Positive ef
fects are driven by a reduction in the barriers on imports of manufactures in the 
EU, which creates a demand expansion that pushes up textile prices in the EU. 
(The growing EU demand for India's textiles is too small to result in upward 
pressure on the world market price for garments.) In combination with the ex
port boom for Indian garments, positive and large terms of trade effects result. 
On the negative side, India purchases more expensive capitalbased goods from 
the EU that replace previous imports from other trading partners.  
 
Output 
Textiles output in India expands in order to accommodate the increasing foreign 
demand. In the particular case the model signals a possible relocation of textiles 
production from the EU into India, which could refer to current pockets of low
cost garment production in the Eastern European member states. In India, the 
demand for the main factors of production (unskilled labour and capital) in
creases proportionally with the expansion of output. By assumption the rising 
demand for labour in the textiles sector will bring upward pressure to the wage 
rate in this sector. This will then drive a relocation of labour into the textiles in
dustry. Probably, however, the analysis underestimates how largescale unem
ployment erodes wage effects and labour mobility.  
 The model indicates limited changes to the structure of textile production. 
The textile industry's increasing demand for cotton and other natural fibres is 
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satisfied largely through an expansion of domestic cotton production (presented 
in table A.2, row heading plantbased fibres). Cotton and fibre imports also rise. 
The effects on the synthetic fibres market remain intangible. In the long run 
such substantial output change will generally affect the labour and capital inten
sity of production through inducing technological change. Such long term dy
namic effects are not included in the model used for this study. 
 The repercussions of the boost of textile exports on the agricultural sector 
are limited yet not negligible. The simulations suggest a minor drop in the pro
duction of primary crops, primarily due to a shift of labour and land resources 
into growing cotton and natural fibres. Just a few hands will move out of agricul
ture into manufacturing. Food selfsufficiency is projected to reduce by 12%, 
such that agricultural imports must expand in order to meet domestic demand. 
 
5.3.3 Including agriculture in the FTA 
 
If we expand the scope of the FTA to include agriculture, the textiles boom is 
moderated a bit by an expansion of Indian agricultural exports to the EU. Nota
bly, the simulations suggest that India may start exporting crops to the EU, rice 
and sugar in particular, after the EU removes its tariff barriers on Indian agricul
tural goods.  
 
Linkage effects 
The overall linkages of these changes to the overall economy are limited. An in
dication is that under the extended FTA India's agriculture is just slightly more 
tradeoriented than before. Agricultural openness, measured by the ratio of ag
ricultural imports and exports to overall GDP, increases modestly from 2.2% of 
GDP to 2.52.6% of GDP. This is largely due to an increase in exports. The im
plications of such a shift on the balance of payments, or the concomitant impact 
on the real exchange rate of the rupee are minor at most.1 
 
Agricultural trade and output  
The simulations suggest that the full FTA will induce rising shares of India in 
global agricultural trade, particularly for food crops. The trade effects largely 
occur between the India and the EU, and the implications on other trade part
ners are minor in general.  
                                                 
1 Such a low level of openness points to the limited scope of WTO policies visàvis domestic ag poli
cies. 
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 The projected expansion of agricultural exports, involving dramatic increases 
of exports into the EU, is concentrated in a few sectors: sugar, rice (paddy and 
processed), meat products nec, dairy products and food product nec. We see 
declining exports in the other sectors as well as a reduction across the board of 
agricultural exports to the rest of the world. Both provide indication that includ
ing agriculture in the FTA may induce a changing position of India in the pattern 
of global agricultural specialisation. There are two directions of change.  
 First, India's agricultural exports become substantially more EUoriented and 
divert away from the rest of the world. The rightmost panel of table A.6 shows 
large jumps from the initial share of the EU in India's exports to the share under 
an agricultureincluding FTA in quite a few sectors. The drivers for a redirection 
of trade to the EU are particularly strong for the complete set of 'growth com
modities' mentioned above.  
 Second, the specialisation is targeted in two cropbased sectors yet includ
ing both the primary and processing activities (see figure 5.14). Sugar expan
sion is highly dramatic but we must largely interpret this as an artefact of the 
model, and not a feasible result. It is due to the notorious complexity of EU 
sugar trade policies, and the incomplete representation of the policies in the 
model and the data (Van Berkum, Roza and Van Tongeren, 2005). Another rea
son for scepticism over the implications on the global sugar market is that India 
is not established as a major sugar exporter from the outset. For this reason we 
are not confident in the feasibility of this particular result, and we do not explore 
it further. 
 The FTA pushes India to strengthen its substantial position in the global rice 
market as a major rice exporter. In dollar value, India is the second largest ex
porter of rice in the base, well behind the ASEAN region, and just ahead of the 
US. India's rice exports largely involved processed rice of high value and quality.  
 A surprising result from the simulation is that global rice trade expands un
der the FTA. The combined global rice trade is projected to expand from a base 
of USD 8.5 to 9.1 billion under EU80 and even 9.6 billion under EU100 (exclud
ing EU intra trade).1 India's share of the global market explodes. India's share of 
global rice exports, for all rice, is projected to expand from 16% to 24% under 
EU80 and further to 29% under EU100. The EU is, of course, largely absorbing 
the expansion India's rice exports. The share of Indian imports into EU is pro
                                                 
1 The simulations suggest a restructuring of India's trade towards a greater share of paddy trade. 
However, this is an artefact of the database: paddy rice is a nontradable good due to its perishable 
nature, and the database entries for paddy rice erroneously include the 'rice in the husk', a tradable 
good. We report on rice sector aggregates in this section. In the base, bulk rice in the husk com
prises a mere 10% of exports, and this is projected to rise above 25% under EU80 and EU100. 
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jected to rise from 1.8% of global rice trade to 12% under EU80 and 18% under 
EU100. Indian exporters may divert a limited share of exports away from other 
key export markets in Bangladesh and other least developed countries and 
Western Asia (label 'xws'). Most of the expansion, however, is made possible by 
an increase in India's rice output. Because of the very large volume of domestic 
rice production in India relative to the global rice market  the total volume of 
global rice trade is but onefourth of India's domestic supply  a limited output 
expansion has tremendous impact on the global rice market. Total rice output is 
projected to increase by about 2.2% under EU80 and 4.1% under EU100. The 
presentation of export shares in figure 5.14 shows that the expansion of rice 
output and exports does not compromise India's share in other markets.  
 
Figure 5.14 India's export shares under a comprehensive IndiaEU FTA 
 
 
 
5.4 Impact of a Doha round on incentives for a FTA 
 
This section briefly explores how a successful multilateral reform under the WTO 
Doha round affects the possible interests in India and EU in an FTA. We re
peated the two scenarios discussed in detail above under the assumption that 
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the globally tariffs are reduced due to a successful conclusion of the Doha 
round of WTO negotiations. 
 
5.4.1 Nonagricultural FTA with a Doha agreement in place 
 
Graphs 5.15 and 5.16 below show (welfare) results of runs simulating non
agricultural trade liberalisation in the context of a successful Doha agreement, 
and are to be compared to figure 5.1 and 5.2.  
 We find similar shapes of the two welfare surfaces which implies that the 
same mechanisms are at play as discussed before. In the case of the EU the al
ready very limited welfare gains found earlier are further reduced, maximum 
gains go down from 0.02% of GDP to 0.01% when a Doha agreement is in 
place. The lower tariffs resulting from a Doha agreement reduces the scope for 
gains to be reaped from a FTA with India. In the case of the 'optimum' non
agricultural liberalisation from an Indian perspective (100% liberalisation by the 
EU and 30% by India) the welfare impact on the EU economy drops to about 
zero. 
 In the case of India we also find lower potential welfare gains, dropping from 
0.14% to 0.09%. The scope for welfare gains for India thus remains larger for 
India. The implementation of a Doha agreement not only lowers the gains to be 
had from a FTA with the EU but also the potential losses from trade diversion. 
By reducing the tariffs of India, a Doha agreement reduces the preferential mar
gin for EU exporters to India in a FTA and therefore the scope for replacement 
of more competitive suppliers not enjoying the preferential treatment European 
suppliers. The maximum loss for the Indian economy (when India would unilater
ally remove its barriers on EU imports) drops from 0.3% of GDP to 0.13% of 
GDP.  
 Based on the aggregate welfare impacts we can thus conclude that a Doha 
agreement would make the aggregate impact of a FTA with India on the EU neg
ligible. In the case of India the maximum welfare loss is reduced more than the 
maximum welfare gain. This implies that although a Doha agreement reduces 
the incentives for engaging in a FTA, by reducing the maximum potential losses 
for India it increase the incentives for India to engage in a FTA.  
 
5.4.2 Agricultural and nonagricultural FTA with a Doha agreement in place 
 
We also repeated the simulation of liberalisation of all (agricultural and non
agricultural) trade with a Doha agreement in place. Graphs 5.17 and 5.18 below 
show (welfare) results of runs simulating nonagricultural trade liberalisation in 
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the context of a successful Doha agreement, and are to be compared to figure 
5.9 and 5.10. 
 For the EU we again find a saddlelike pattern but much less pronounced 
than in figure 5.9. This already suggest that a global reduction in tariffs through 
a Doha agreement reduces optimal tariff effect for the EU.  
 
Figure 5.15 Simulated welfare impacts of Doha reform and non
agricultural FTA liberalisation on EU 
 
 
 However, at the same time the 'optimum' level of tariff reduction shifts from 
between 70 and 80% without a Doha agreement to around 40%. This is the 
same level as found by McDonald and Walmsley (2004) for a FTA between the 
EU and SouthAfrica. The hypothesis of McDonald and Walmsley that multilateral 
liberalisation changes the incentives for agricultural liberalisation is thus con
firmed. We find that agricultural liberalisation with a Doha agreement in place 
reduces total welfare gains and reduces the 'optimal' amount of liberalisation for 
the EU, compared with a situation without a Doha agreement. 
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Figure 5.16 Simulated welfare impacts of Doha reform and non
agricultural FTA liberalisation on India 
 
 
Figure 5.17 Simulated welfare impacts of Doha reform and agricultural 
FTA liberalisation on EU 
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 In the case of India we do not find any changes in the pattern of welfare 
changes with varying degrees of liberalisation (figure 5.17). The welfare surface 
is shifted down to about half the impact found of liberalisation of all sectors 
without a Doha agreement (figure 5.10). Multilateral liberalisation thus reduces 
the incentives for a FTA with the EU, but does not changes the incentives for a 
particular level of liberalisation. 
 
Figure 5.18 Simulated welfare impacts of Doha reform and agricul
tural FTA liberalisation on India 
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6 Conclusions 
 
 
This study examines a possible arrangement between the EU and India, as a 
case study on the interests of developing countries in a free trade agreement 
(FTA) with highincome partners. Its aim is to examine the interests of both par
ties in slashing tariffs on bilateral merchandise trade. Of particular interest are 
the implications for agricultural markets, given the tension between agricultural 
liberalisation and India's policy goals relating to selfsufficiency in food grains 
and poverty reduction. The analysis employs a global economywide model 
(GTAPAGR) using a recent database. Elements of 'deep' economic integration, 
which relate to regulatory harmonisation, the facilitation of crossborder ser
vices trade and investment and so on, are not examined. 
 The macroeconomic effects of changes in policies are assessed by the well
established welfare economic compensation measure. Since the impact of FTAs 
are ambiguous, the outcome of the opposing forces of trade creation and trade 
diversion needs to be assessed empirically. India's interests in a regional trade 
agreement with the EU are downplayed by the fact that India's economy is not 
well integrated in global markets. Particularly agriculture is a closed sector by 
all measures. India's main offensive interest in an FTA with the EU concerns tar
iff concessions for industrial products (textiles in particular), and much the same 
goes for the EU visàvis India. Possible defensive interests are evident from In
dia's current tariff schedule and structure of imports, which point at possibly 
large trade diversion effects under an agreement with the EU and displacement 
effects as domestic producers suffer from the increased competition of imports 
from the EU. Such effects, combined with the pivotal role claimed for agriculture 
in livelihood strategies of the poor and vulnerable, explain why agriculture plays 
a marginal role in India's bilateral and regional agreements and is excluded in 
most cases.  
 An interpretation of the simulated welfare effects, combined with a review of 
the effects on factors of production, output and trade, leads to the following 
conclusions:  
 
 'The overall interests of India in a trade deal with the EU that slashes tariffs 
on bilateral merchandise trade are limited, although specific risks and gains 
are present.' 
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 India has little to gain and much to lose from a free trade agreement with the 
EU if it merely involves tariff reduction in trade with the EU. A stronger economic 
rationale for a free trade agreement with the EU is possibly found in the benign 
effects of 'deep' economic integration, i.e. a move towards an economic space 
where goods and capital move without barriers under jointly shared rules  but 
these have not been examined. The impact of tariff reduction under a possible 
EU  India free trade agreement involves potential losses from a farreaching FTA 
with the EU. The EU, an important source of industrial imports for India, will ex
pand its position on the Indian market in the area of industrial goods and extrac
tion goods, particularly at the expense of lowercost producers in Asian 
countries. The EU is hardly a logical trading partner for more labourintensive 
manufactures or for agricultural products from the perspective of production 
costs. The widely feared displacement of domestic production by imports of EU 
origin appears limited, however, and few Indian jobs are directly at risk. As far 
as offensive exportrelated interests are concerned, the study finds gains re
lated to improving the access for export products to the EU market, reducing 
input costs for export industries in parallel with improved access to highquality 
input. This transfer of technology is intertwined with an agenda for direct in
vestment into India. Particular product related offensive interests explored in 
model simulations conditional on the EU opening up markets involve textiles, 
cotton for intermediate deliveries to textiles industry, rice, and possibly sugar. 
 
 'The EU economy remains unperturbed by integration with India.' 
 
 The simulations indicate limited scope for welfare gains in the EU, but on the 
other hand no major welfare losses either. Sectorspecific interests include of
fensive interests in capitalintensive manufacturing and natural resource extrac
tion (presumably oil and fuels). Offensive interests for an agricultureinclusive 
deal are present in the fruits and vegetables sector. 
 
 'The estimated positive impacts from an EU  India FTA erode under a suc
cessful global trade reform embodied by a possible Doha agreement.' 
 
 As expected, a global reform reduces the potential gains for India from an 
FTA with the EU and, at the same time, narrows the scope for trade diversion 
and concurrent efficiency losses. For India, a moderation of the risk of strong 
losses could provide leeway to embark on a track of bilateral integration with 
the EU despite a strong economic rationale. In the EU, multilateral liberalisation 
reduces the incentives for a FTA with India, but it does not change the incentives 
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for a particular level of liberalisation. For the EU we find even smaller welfare 
gains with a Doha agreement in place, but also the optimal level of liberalisation 
of agriculture reduces from 80 to 40%.  
 
 'An EU  India agreement on merchandise trade is unlikely to embody sub
stantial preferential treatment with regard to market access.' 
 
 If the welfare analysis outlines the feasible options for trade integration be
tween India and the EU, the arrangement would be characterised by a strong 
asymmetry: even though full liberalisation of agriculture by India would be 'opti
mal' for the EU (see table), this is still combined with a strongly asymmetric lib
eralisation of nonagriculture (100% by EU and 30% by India). The analysis 
indicates that it would be in the interest of both partners if the EU provides large 
concessions to India for access to its markets, while India keeps the bulk of cur
rent border protection. This finding contrasts with the current trade policy of the 
EU which focuses on reciprocal trade agreements, and it is potentially conflict
ing with WTO rules that require a FTA to cover 'substantially all the trade' be
tween the constituent members. It is therefore likely that an EU  India 
agreement will embody a wide coverage of merchandise trade, even if excluding 
from its coverage sensitive areas in agriculture and textiles like many other 
FTAs. At the same time, the depth of preferential treatment on market access 
that India and the EU will grant to imports from their FTA partner will probably be 
modest, and engineered towards specific benign impact in certain areas. 
 
 'Agriculture is a key sector for India in the consideration of equity and 
growth purposes of a FTA with EU.' 
 
 India's welfaremaximising policy, given full liberalisation by the EU, involves 
a 30% cut of agricultural import tariffs for EU products and a 70% cut of tariffs 
on other merchandise trade. Agricultural reform creates large rents for land
owners, and has a limited pull effect on unskilled labour. This strategy maxi
mises income gains (an approximation of economic growth), and it generates 
small but positive effects on poverty alleviation. A maximisation of poverty alle
viation effects requires an alternative policy, i.e. a deeper liberalisation of manu
factures trade while leaving agricultural protection at the status quo. This policy, 
basically a textilesoriented export strategy, results in a pull of unskilled labour 
demand in textiles and cotton farming, resulting in positive employment (or 
wage) effects for landless and urban labourers. Substantial poverty alleviating 
effects are achieved, however, at the expense of income gains due to strong 
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trade diversion effects. These are indications that trade policies in India feature 
a tradeoff between a stronggrowth policy and poverty alleviation, pressing the 
need for the government of India to strike a balance between these potentially 
conflicting goals. 
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